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1. Introduction
The so-called P⁄ model (see Hallman, Porter and Small [14]) is often used (or at least referred
to) in discussions of monetary targeting (for instance, in Jahnke and Reimers [17], Neumann
[21], T￿dter and Reimers [27], T￿dter and Ziebarth [28] and von Hagen [29]). This may give the
impression that the P⁄ model provides some rationale for money-growth targeting, especially
since the P⁄ model seems to be part of the Bundesbank￿s view of the transmission mechanism
of monetary policy, see Jahnke and Reimers [17]. This short paper examines whether the P⁄
model indeed provides any such rationale.
Furthermore, in its monetary strategy, the Eurosystem has given a prominent role to a
money-growth indicator, the deviation of current M3 growth from a speci￿ed reference value,
as an indicator of ￿threats to price stability￿ (see ECB [9]-[11]). Using conventional aggregate-
supply and aggregate-demand relations, Svensson [26] has argued that this money-growth indi-
cator is likely to be an inferior indicator of such threats, and that an in￿ation forecast is instead
the natural indicator. This paper also examines whether the P⁄ model provides any support for
the Eurosystem money-growth indicator.
The main result of the paper is that, although the P⁄ model gives a prominent role to real
balances in forecasting in￿ation and, hence, to a ￿real money gap￿ as an important indica-
tor, it does not provide any support for either a Bundesbank-style money-growth target or a
Eurosystem-style money-growth indicator.
Section 2 presents a slight generalization of the basic P⁄ model. Section 3 relates in￿ation
and real balances. Section 4 derives in￿ation forecasts for the P⁄ model. Section 5 speci￿es a
money-demand function. Section 6 compares in￿ation targeting and money-growth targeting.
Section 7 discusses the reaction functions that follow from the two kinds of targeting. Section 8
presents the conclusions.
2. The P ⁄ model
De￿ne (log) velocity vt by the quantity equation,
vt · pt + yt ¡ mt; (2.1)
where pt, yt and mt are the (logs of the) price level, output and (nominal) money, respectively,
in period t.
1Consider a long-run equilibrium with (log) output equal to (log) potential output, y⁄
t; velocity
equal to long-run equilibrium (log) velocity, v⁄
t, and the (log) price level equal to a long-run
equilibrium level (for a given stock of money, mt), p⁄




t+m t : (2.2)
Furthermore, in line with the P⁄ literature, make the assumption that the in￿ation dynamics
are given by
…t =( 1¡ﬁ ¢ p) … t ¡ 1+ﬁ ¢ p¢ p ⁄
t ¡ 1¡ﬁ p( p t ¡ 1¡p ⁄
t ¡ 1)+" t; (2.3)
where …t · pt ¡ pt¡1; 0 • ﬁ¢p • 1, ﬁp > 0, ¢p⁄
t · p⁄
t ¡ p⁄
t¡1,a n d" tis an iid shock with
zero mean. Equation (2.3) for given ﬁ¢p is a slight generalization of the P⁄ model. Hallman,
Porter and Small [14] assumes (2.3) with ﬁ¢p =0 . T￿dter and Reimers [27] assume a variant of
(2.3) with ﬁ¢p =1 . Neumann [21] also assumes a variant of (2.3) with ﬁ¢p =1 ;but with the
variables on the right side all dated t.
Thus, according to (2.3), in￿ation is determined by lagged in￿ation, …t¡1, lagged P⁄ in￿ation,
¢p⁄
t¡1, and the lagged ￿price gap,￿ pt¡1 ¡ p⁄
t¡1.
3. In￿ation and the real money gap
I ￿nd it instructive to express (2.3) in terms of real balances. First, note that
pt ¡ p⁄
t ·¡m t+p t+m t¡p ⁄
t ·¡(~ m t¡ ~ m ⁄
t); (3.1)
where ~ mt · mt ¡ pt is (log) real balances and ~ m⁄
t · mt ¡ p⁄
t is long-run equilibrium (log) real





Thus, the price gap is the negative of the ￿real money gap,￿ ~ mt ¡ ~ m⁄
t.
Then, using (3.1) and ¢p⁄
t · …t +¢ (~ m t¡~ m ⁄
t) , we can write (2.3) as
…t = …t¡1 + ﬁm(~ m t¡1¡ ~ m ⁄
t¡1)+ﬁ ¢ m¢( ~ mt¡1 ¡ ~ m⁄
t¡1)+" t; (3.3)
where ﬁm · ﬁp and ﬁ¢m · ﬁ¢p.
Thus, in￿ation depends on lagged in￿ation, the lagged real money gap, ~ mt¡1 ¡ ~ m⁄
t¡1 and
when ﬁ¢m > 0; also on the change in the lagged real money gap, ¢(~ mt¡1¡ ~ m⁄
t¡1). Compared to
conventional backward-looking Phillips curves, where in￿ation depends on lagged in￿ation and
2the output gap, the real money gap simply replaces the output gap. Thus, whereas the discussion
about money as an indicator has often centered on the role of real balances for aggregate demand
and output (see Meltzer [20]), the P⁄ model puts real balances ￿rmly in the in￿ation equation.
4. In￿ation forecasts
Let us now consider in￿ation forecasts in the P⁄ model. By (3.3), the one-period-ahead in￿ation
forecast can be written
…t+1jt = …t + ﬁm(~ m t¡ ~ m ⁄
t)+ﬁ ¢ m¢(~ mt ¡ ~ m⁄
t); (4.1)
where, for any variable x; xt+¿jt · Etxt+¿ denotes the forecast of xt+¿ conditional on information
available in period t. Furthermore, by solving (4.1) backwards, we can express the T-period-
ahead in￿ation forecast, …t+Tjt,a s
… t + Tj t=… t+ﬁ m
T¡ 1 X
¿ =0
(~ m t+¿jt¡ ~ m ⁄
t+¿jt)+ﬁ ¢ m[(~ mt+T¡1jt ¡ ~ m⁄
t+T¡1jt) ¡ (~ m t¡1¡ ~ m ⁄
t¡1)]: (4.2)
Thus, the T-period-ahead in￿ation forecast depends on current in￿ation in period t, the forecast
of the sequence of real money gaps from period t to t+T ¡1; and the forecast of the change in
real money gap from period t ¡ 1 to period t + T ¡ 1.
5. Money demand
The money stock in the P⁄ model is broad money, typically M2 or M3. This is an endogenous
variable, imperfectly controlled by the central bank. Similarly, the real money gap is an en-
dogenous variable that can only be imperfectly controlled by the central bank. In practice, the
central bank￿s control over broad money is exercised via control of a short interest rate which
then a⁄ects the demand for broad money. In turn, the central bank￿s control over short interest
rates is exercised via control over the nonborrowed monetary base, or some component of the
nonborrowed monetary base. For practical purposes, it is su¢cient to regard a short nominal in-
terest rate as the central bank￿s instrument. Money is then an endogenous variable, determined
by money demand.
Consider a reasonably realistic money-demand function, the error-correction form
¢~ m t=¡• m(~ m t¡1¡• yy t¡1+• ii t¡1)+• 1¢~ m t¡1+￿ t; (5.1)
3where •m;• y;• i >0, • 1 ‚0, i t is the short nominal interest rate in period t and the central
bank￿s instrument, and ￿t is an iid money-demand shock with zero mean. This money-demand
function implies a long-run money-demand function equal to
~ mt = •yyt ¡ •iit; (5.2)
where •y is the long-run elasticity of real balances with respect to output and •i the long-
run semi-elasticity with respect the interest rate. In the short run, demand for real balances
adjusts to the discrepancy between lagged real balances, ~ mt¡1, and the long-run real balances,
•yyt¡1 ¡ •iit¡1, and to the change in lagged real balances, ¢~ m t¡1. Since real balances react
with a lag to the central bank￿s instrument and real balances are also subject to shocks after
the instrument is set, the central bank then only has imperfect control over money.1
With this money-demand equation, long-run equilibrium real balances are given by
~ m⁄
t · •yy⁄
t ¡ •ii⁄; (5.3)
where potential output, y⁄
t, and the long-run equilibrium interest rate, i⁄, are substituted into
the long-run money-demand equation (5.2). Here, the long run equilibrium interest rate is given
by
i⁄ · r⁄ +^ …; (5.4)
where r⁄ is the long-run equilibrium level of the real interest rate and ^ … is an in￿ation target
and the long-run equilibrium in￿ation rate. Both r⁄ and ^ …, and hence ^ …, are here assumed to
be constant.2
It follows from (5.1) that velocity is given by
vt · yt ¡ ~ mt = yt ¡ ~ mt¡1 + •m(~ m t¡1¡• yy t¡1+• ii t¡1)¡• 1¢~ m t¡1¡￿ t; (5.5)
whereas the long-run equilibrium velocity is given by
v⁄
t =( 1¡• y) y ⁄
t +• ii ⁄: (5.6)
The long-run equilibrium price level, p⁄
t,i st h e ng i v e nb y
p ⁄
t=¡• yy ⁄
t+• ii ⁄+m t: (5.7)
1 See Browne, Fagan and Henry [3] for a survey of European money-demand functions. This money-demand
function is estimated and used by Rudebusch and Svensson [22] in discussing the performance of monetary
targeting in the U.S. It is estimated for Euro-area data by Gerlach and Svensson [13].
2 If there is a trend ¢y
⁄ in y
⁄
t and/or a trend ¢i
⁄ in i
⁄
t (the latter due to a trend in r
⁄
t and/or ^ …t), the equation
(5.1) should include a constant, ¢~ m t =• 0¡• m(~ m t¡ 1¡• yy t¡ 1+• ii t¡ 1)+• 1¢~ m t ¡1+￿ t;where the constant is
given by •0 =( • y¢ y
⁄¡• i¢ i
⁄) = (1 ¡ •1). In order to reduce clutter, this constant has been deleted.
46. Strict in￿ation targeting and the money-growth target or indicator
Consider now the simple case of ￿strict￿ in￿ation targeting, when the central bank￿s only ob-
jective is to stabilize in￿ation around the in￿ation target, ^ ….3 With the above money-demand
equation, the central bank can a⁄ect real balances in period t +1;by setting the instrument in
period t. By (3.3), real balances in period t +1a⁄ects in￿ation in period t +2 .C l e a r l y , t h e
optimal policy under strict in￿ation targeting is then to set the interest rate such that the two-
period-ahead in￿ation forecast, …t+2jt; conditional on information available in period t,e q u a l s
the in￿ation target,
…t+2jt =^ … . (6.1)
By leading (4.1) one period and taking expectations in period t, we get the two-period-ahead
in￿ation forecast as
…t+2jt = …t+1jt + ﬁm(~ m t+1jt ¡ ~ m⁄
t+1jt)+ﬁ ¢ m¢(~ mt+1jt ¡ ~ m⁄
t+1jt): (6.2)
Combining (6.1) and (6.2) and solving for ~ mt+1jt gives




(…t+1jt ¡ ^ …)+
ﬁ ¢ m
ﬁ m+ﬁ ¢ m
(~ m t¡ ~ m ⁄
t): (6.3)
The right side of (6.3) is a forecast of the state-dependent level of real balances in period t+1 that
is consistent with strict in￿ation targeting. We can interpret this as a conditional intermediate
target for real balances in period t +1 .
Let us express (6.3) as a conditional intermediate target for nominal money-growth,
¢mt+1jt · ¢~ m t+1jt + …t+1jt
=^ … +¢~ m ⁄
t +1jt ¡
1 ¡ ﬁm ¡ ﬁ¢m
ﬁm + ﬁ¢m
(…t+1jt ¡ ^ …) ¡
ﬁm
ﬁm + ﬁ¢m
(~ m t¡ ~ m ⁄
t): (6.4)
Thus, we can de￿ne
d ¢mt+1jt · ^ … +¢~ m ⁄
t +1jt ¡
1 ¡ ﬁm ¡ ﬁ¢m
ﬁm + ﬁ¢m
(…t+1jt ¡ ^ …) ¡
ﬁm
ﬁm + ﬁ¢m
(~ m t¡ ~ m ⁄
t) (6.5)
as a conditional nominal money-growth target that is consistent with strict in￿ation targeting.
This money-growth target is ￿conditional￿ in the sense that it depends on the current and
lagged state of the economy, more precisely the deviation between the one-period-ahead in￿ation




¿Lt+¿,w h e r e0<–<1is a discount factor and the period loss is given by Lt =
1
2(…t ¡ ^ …)
2.
That is, in￿ation is the only variable entering the loss function.
5forecast (which is predetermined under (3.3) and (5.1) and cannot be a⁄ected by the central
bank) and the current real money-gap, ~ mt ¡ ~ m⁄
t.
Let us now contrast this conditional money-growth target with the Bundesbank money-
growth target, or the Eurosystem reference value for money growth. Until Germany joined the
EMU, each December, Bundesbank calculated its money-growth target for the coming year,
as the sum of an in￿ation target (over the years called ￿unavoidable in￿ation,￿ ￿normative￿
in￿ation or ￿medium-term price assumption￿), a forecast of potential output growth, less an
estimated velocity trend. The Eurosystem currently calculates its reference value for M3 growth
in the same way (see European Central Bank [10]). Thus, the Bundesbank money-growth target
and the Eurosystem reference value, ¢m⁄
t+1jt,a r eg i v e nb y
¢ m ⁄
t +1jt =^ …+¢ y ⁄
t +1jt ¡ ¢v⁄
t+1jt · ^ … +¢~ m ⁄
t +1jt; (6.6)
where we have used (3.2).4 This is an ￿unconditional￿ money-growth target, in the sense that it
only depends on potential output growth and the velocity trend, which from the point of view
of monetary policy are either exogenous or change only slowly with the current state of the
economy.
It follows that the discrepancy between the conditional money-growth target (6.5) and the
unconditional money-growth target (6.6) is given by
d ¢mt+1jt ¡ ¢m⁄
t+1jt = ¡
1 ¡ ﬁm ¡ ﬁ¢m
ﬁm + ﬁ¢m
(…t+1jt ¡ ^ …) ¡
ﬁm
ﬁm + ﬁ¢m
(~ m t¡ ~ m ⁄
t):
This discrepancy can be interpreted in two ways. First, it shows that there is a tradeo⁄ be-
tween stabilizing in￿ation around the in￿ation target ^ … and stabilizing money-growth around
the unconditional money-growth target (6.6). Thus, minimizing in￿ation variability around the
in￿ation target would require a variable conditional money-growth target and generally lead to
higher than minimum variability of money-growth. Minimizing money-growth variability around
an unconditional money-growth target would generally lead to higher than minimum variability
of in￿ation. The tradeo⁄ between stabilizing in￿ation and stabilizing money-growth is empiri-
cally estimated for U.S. data in Rudebusch and Svensson [22] and found to be substantial.
Second, the discrepancy shows that the Eurosystem money-growth indicator,
¢mt ¡ ¢m⁄
tjt¡1; (6.7)
4 This is a simpli￿cation, in order to reduce clutter. If the period is a quarter, the money-growth target is
¢4m
⁄
t+4jt =4 ^ …+¢ 4y
⁄
t +4jt ¡ ¢4v
⁄
t+4jt · 4^ … +¢ 4~ m
⁄
t +4jt; where ¢4xt · xt ¡ xt¡4.
6the deviation of current money-growth from the reference value,5 is likely to be an inferior
indicator of future in￿ation deviations from the in￿ation target. This can be seen more directly
by expressing the deviation of the two-period-ahead in￿ation forecast from the in￿ation target
as a function of this money-growth indicator. Subtracting ^ … from (6.2) and rewriting gives
…t+2jt ¡ ^ … = …t+1jt ¡ ^ … ¡ (ﬁm + ﬁ¢m)¢~ m⁄
t+1jt + ﬁm(~ m t¡ ~ m ⁄
t)+( ﬁ m+ﬁ ¢ m)¢~ mt+1jt:
Taking expectations of (5.1), substituting for ¢~ m t+1jt, collecting all terms involving ¢~ m t,a n d
replacing ¢~ m t by ¢mt ¡ …t then gives, after some algebra,
…t+2jt ¡ ^ … = …t+1jt ¡ ^ … ¡ (ﬁm + ﬁ¢m)¢~ m⁄
t+1jt ¡ ﬁm ~ m⁄
t +( ﬁ m+ﬁ ¢ m) • m( • yy t¡• ii t)
+[ ﬁ m¡( ﬁ m+ﬁ ¢ m) • m]~ m t¡1¡[ﬁ m+( ﬁ m+ﬁ ¢ m)(•1 ¡ •m)](…t ¡ ¢m⁄
tjt¡1)
+[ﬁm +( ﬁ m+ﬁ ¢ m)(•1 ¡ •m)](¢mt ¡ ¢m⁄
tjt¡1): (6.8)
Here the last term in (6.8) isolates the e⁄ect of the current money-growth indicator, (6.7), on
the deviation of the two-period-ahead in￿ation forecast from the in￿ation target. It seems fairly
obvious that the relation between that deviation and the money-growth indicator is tenuous, to
say the least. The in￿ation forecast is a⁄ected by much more than the money-growth indicator.
At least, the sign of this e⁄ect is likely to be positive, though, since empirically 0 <• m<• 1is
typical.
Thus, using the money-growth indicator as indicating deviations of the in￿ation forecast
from the in￿ation target disregards the other determinants of the in￿ation forecast in (6.8).
Furthermore, the partial e⁄ect of the indicator may even be negative. Thus, the money-growth
indicator is likely to be a misleading indicator of ￿risks to price stability.￿ Instead, as argued in
Svensson [26], the best indicator of such risks seems to be the deviation between the two-period-
ahead in￿ation forecast and the in￿ation target for unchanged interest rate, it = it¡1.T h i s
deviation then indicates deviations from the in￿ation target unless the instrument is changed.
7. Reaction functions
Finally, let us note what the reaction functions for the short interest rate are under strict in￿ation
targeting and strict money-growth targeting with the Buba-style money-growth target (6.6).6
5 Again, this is a simpli￿cation to reduce clutter. If the period is a quarter, the money-growth indicator can
be written as ¢4mt ¡ ¢4m
⁄
tjt¡4, or rather, to judge from Eurosystem announcements, as a three-month moving
average of this expression.
6 Strict money-growth targeting with a money-growth target d ¢mt means minimizing an intertemporal loss
function as in footnote 3 but with a period loss function given by Lt =
1
2(¢mt ¡ d ¢mt)
2. That is, money growth
is the only variable entering the loss function.
7Under the P⁄ model, summarized by (2.3) or (3.3), these reaction functions clearly depend on
the assumed money-demand function, (5.1).
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(~ m t¡ ~ m ⁄
t) (7.2)
Replacing ¢~ m t+1jt by ¢m⁄
t+1jt ¡ …t+1jt and using (6.6) instead gives the reaction function


















which, of course, is di⁄erent from that under strict in￿ation targeting.
Note that strict in￿ation targeting does generally not result in a reaction function like
it = i⁄ + ￿(…t ¡ ^ …)
or
it = i⁄ + ￿(…t+1jt ¡ ^ …).
Similarly, strict money-growth targeting does generally not imply a reaction of (or similar to)
the form
it = i⁄ + ￿(¢mt ¡ ¢m⁄
tjt¡1):
This illustrates the general principle that it is better to respond to the determinants of the target
variables than to the target variables themselves, see Svensson [23].
8. Conclusions
Let us now summarize the conclusions for targeting a Bundesbank-style money-growth target
and using a Eurosystem-style money-growth indicator from this examination of the P⁄ model.
First, we have noticed that, for the P⁄ model, in￿ation depends on lagged in￿ation and the
level of and changes in the lagged real money gaps, the di⁄erence between real balances and
8long-run equilibrium real balances. Thus, as shown in (6.2), the one-period-ahead in￿ation
forecast depends on current in￿ation and the current level of and changes in the real money
gap. Similarly, the T-period-ahead in￿ation forecast depends on current in￿ation, the forecast
of the sequence of future real money gaps, and the forecast of the change in the real money gap
during the forecast horizon. Thus, the P⁄ model assigns a dominant role to the real money gap
in forecasting in￿ation.
Nevertheless, this does not provide any rationale for targeting a Bundesbank-style nominal
money-growth target (where the money-growth target is set as the sum of an in￿ation target
and a forecast of potential output growth, less an estimated velocity trend). Stabilization of
in￿ation around an in￿ation target instead requires a conditional money-growth target, (6.5),
which deviates from the Bundesbank-style money-growth target, depending on the deviation of
current in￿ation from the in￿ation target and the lagged real money gap.
Thus, it follows that the P⁄ model does not give any rationale for the Eurosystem-style
money-growth indicator either. Indeed, for stabilizing in￿ation around the in￿ation target, it
is optimal to allow money-growth to deviate from the reference-value most of the time. The
current money-growth indicator seems to be an inferior indicator of future in￿ation deviations
from the in￿ation target.
The reaction function corresponding to strict in￿ation targeting (which minimizes the vari-
ability of in￿ation and leads to larger than minimum variability of money growth) will obviously
di⁄er from that corresponding to targeting a Bundesbank-style money-growth target (which
minimizes the variability of money-growth but leads to a larger than minimum variance of
in￿ation).
Although the discussion in this paper has been in terms of strict in￿ation targeting (without
any weight on output gap stabilization), it is fairly obvious that the conclusions about the P⁄
model not providing any rationale for monetary targeting or a money-growth indicator will also
hold under more realistic ￿￿exible￿ in￿ation targeting, where the loss function also includes
some weight on the variability of the output gap.7
As far as I know, there is little theoretical support for the P⁄ model. The empirical support
is mixed (see Christiano [6]). Gerlach and Svensson [13] ￿nd considerable empirical support for
the P⁄ model for the Euro-area, but no support for the U.S. Even if the P⁄ model turned out to
be a good description of in￿ation dynamics and the transmission mechanism of monetary policy
7 A previous version of this paper also examined ￿exible in￿ation targeting and con￿rmed this statement. This
requires the speci￿cation of how output is determined.
9for the Euro area, it would still not imply that targeting a Bundesbank-style money-growth
target or relying on a European-style money-growth indicator would be appropriate.
The recent interest in monetary targeting is mainly motivated by the view that monetary
targeting is the reason behind Bundesbank￿s outstanding record on in￿ation control and the
possibility that the Eurosystem would choose monetary targeting as its monetary-policy strat-
egy. However, with regard to whether monetary targeting lies behind Bundesbank￿s success, as
discussed in Svensson [26] for instance, a number of studies of Bundesbank￿s monetary policy,
by both German and non-German scholars, have come to the unanimous conclusion that, in
the frequent con￿icts between stabilizing in￿ation around the in￿ation target and stabilizing
money-growth around the money-growth target, Bundesbank has consistently given priority to
the in￿ation target and disregarded the monetary target.8 Thus, Bundesbank has actually been
an in￿ation targeter in deeds and a monetary targeter in words only. Furthermore, although the
Eurosystem has adopted a money-growth indicator, it has strongly rejected monetary targeting
as a suitable strategy, on the grounds that the relations between prices and money may not be
su¢ciently stable and that the monetary aggregates with the best stability properties may not
be su¢ciently controllable (see Issing [16]). Furthermore, an extensive and convincing discussion
some 25 years ago concluded that intermediate monetary targeting was generally inferior; see,
for instance, Kareken, Muench and Wallace [18], Friedman [12] and Bryant [5].9
Thus, whereas money-growth targeting is currently hardly a relevant alternative monetary
policy, the Eurosystem gives considerable emphasis in its rhetoric, although, so far, not in its
practice, to the money-growth indicator, as an indicator of ￿threats to price stability.￿ Svensson
[26], using conventional aggregate supply and aggregate demand equations, has demonstrated
that the money-growth indicator is likely to be an inferior indicator of such threats, and that
an in￿ation forecast is instead the best indicator. Assuming instead the P⁄ model, the present
paper arrives at the same conclusions.
Rudebusch and Svensson [22] examine the consequences of monetary targeting in an empirical
8 This literature includes Neumann [21], von Hagen [29], Bernanke and Mihov [2], Clarida and Gertler [8],
Clarida, Gali and Gertler [7] (note a crucial typo: the coe¢cient for money supply in Table 1 should be 0.07
instead of 0.7), Laubach and Posen [19], and Bernanke, Laubach, Mishkin and Posen [1].
9 A separate argument for monetary targeting is that it would be preferable when there is considerable model
uncertainty. Indeed, Brunner and Meltzer [4] argue that monetary targeting would minimize the maximum loss
when there is considerable model uncertainty. (This is an interesting early example of an argument involving
￿robust control￿, a minmax approach to optimal control recently discussed by Hansen and Sargent [15].) The
Brunner-Meltzer argument remains to be examined rigorously. Furthermore, in practice there seem to be su¢cient
information about the transmission mechanism for monetary policy to be able to do better than monetary tar-
geting. For example, Bundesbank￿s deliberate deviations from strict monetary targeting and success in in￿ation
control is strong evidence of this.
10model of in￿ation, output and money for the U.S. They ￿nd that monetary targeting in the U.S.
would be quite ine¢cient, in the sense of causing high variability of both in￿ation and the output
gap. They also show that this would, counter to conventional wisdom, also be the case if money
demand were completely stable. Gerlach and Svensson [13] examine the empirical indicator
properties of monetary aggregates for the Euro area. They ￿nd substantial empirical support
for the real money gap as an indicator for future in￿ation, but little support for the nominal
money-growth indicator.
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